for the realization of an exercise of infallibility by the pope; (2) the manner in which the factual achievement of these conditions is determined.
There are four conditions: (1) the pope must be in union with the faith of the Church universal, and he must be acting as the expresser of that faith; (2) he must be acting in his capacity of chief shepherd and teacher of all the faithful and not just as the bishop of Rome or in some lesser capacity; (3) he must be utilizing his supreme apostolic authority; (4) he must be teaching a revealed doctrine of faith or morals in such a way as to bind definitively all the faithful. When these conditions are fulfilled, the doctrinal decision of the pope is irreformable of itself and does not require some specific, overt prior or subsequent approval by the Church. 16 How is the determination made that the conditions given above have actually been achieved in a given case? This is the crux of the difficulty. Two basic answers are possible. The first assumes without reflection that the pope himself decides when he has fulfilled the conditions. This assumption appears to have been made by the Fathers at Vatican I. Though they never debated this question, their discussions often appear to take for granted that the pope alone determines when he has achieved the conditions of infallibility. To my knowledge, there is no monograph on the subject. What is certain is that Vatican I did not decide definitively by whom and by what process the determination is made.
The textbooks and theologians after Vatican I until the present have generally continued to assume that the pope decides on the existence of these conditions. The evidence that they make this assumption is clear. On the one hand, standard treatments of the subject simply do not raise the issue of who judges with regard to the existence of the conditions.
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On the other hand, when these same treatments come to the conclusion that the Immaculate Conception and Assumption are infallibly taught by the pope, they cite as evidence that in the pertinent papal documents defining these dogmas the pope indicates that he intends to fulfil the conditions given by Vatican I. This is sufficient. Such a sufficiency can only be explained if these theologians assume that the pope is the one to decide when he has achieved the conditions. 18 For a more extended treatment of the assumption made by the authors of the textbooks Küng himself takes for granted that the determination rests with the pope alone. It is this assumption that causes him to speak of papal absolutism and makes him say that "the qualifications of Vatican II do not prevent the pope in any way from issuing infallible... proclamations, whenever and wherever he wishes, exactly as Vatican I wanted and decided." 19 However, there is another view that can be expressed in two propositions. First, it is not the pope who decides that he has achieved the conditions. The pope is not to make this decision on the general principle that no person should be a judge in his or her own case. The exercise of infallibility is a charism, and in the exercise of no other charism is the person involved the judge that she/he has exercised the charism faithfully. For example, the OT prophets certainly had an office set up by the Lord, but the guarantee that one of these prophets truly spoke out in a given case for the Lord was not his assertion "Thus says the Lord!" The actual fulfilment of the prophecy was the acid test, and even the great biblical prophets did not always pass that test.
According to this view, it is not an insuperable objection that the assumption has long existed that the pope is the one to decide when he has fulfilled the conditions. The history of theology is filled with assumptions which everyone took for granted but which were refuted when the questions underlying the assumptions were made explicit and then carefully investigated. Until very recent times it was assumed in the Church that the four Gospels were basically biographies of Christ. No one educated in the Scriptures holds that view today. At Trent everyone assumed that one man and one woman existed in the beginning. In fact, this assumption was the basis for many a textbook assertion that it was a dogma of the faith that all human beings are descended from a single pair. Today few, if any, theologians hold this to be a dogma. In short, the fact that some notion has been taken for granted without reflection by most Christians is not a proof that it belongs to the Church's enduring tradition.
The second proposition is that the proof that the pope has fulfilled the conditions is the recognition by the universal Church that his articulation resonates with the faith-life of that Church. It will be noted that all the conditions for the exercise of papal infallibility partake of the characteristic of universality: the pope must be acting as the head of the universal Church using the fulness of his universal teaching power; he must be defining for all the faithful; he must be articulating what pertains to the public universal revelation of faith or morals, not to private revelations. 20 and for an amplified explanation of the view I support below, see my "Infallibility: Another Approach," HeyJ 21 (1980) 376-92.
19 Infallible? 104. 20 Vatican II indicated that the pope exercises infallibility only as representative of the What better evidence can there be that he has actually fulfilled these conditions of universality than that what he says accords with the universal faith of Christians? This is the heart of the ancient doctrine of reception.
21
Note, further, that this view does not contradict the teaching of Vatican I that when the conditions are fulfilled the pope exercises the Church's infallibility even if there is no overt consent of the Church. The pope is endowed with the Church's infallibility when he achieves the conditions. Reception by the Church does not make a fallible decision infallible. It manifests that the conditions for infallibility have been realized and that the decision reached before any reception by the Church was actually accompanied by those conditions which rendered it an irreformable doctrinal definition.
THE DOCTRINE KÜNG PROPOSES
The term "infallibility" carries for Küng overtones of a priori infallibility. Since he rejects such infallibility, he thinks, with reason, that it is best to eliminate the term "infallibility" from the theological vocabulary and to substitute for it a term which better conveys what he believes is the correct doctrine of enduring truth in the Church. That correct doctrine is more aptly named "indefectibility," a word which refers to perenniality not only in being but also in truth.
22
What must be avoided is the characterization of Küng's view of indefectibility as some vague persistence in a path toward truth in which errors are constantly being corrected but in which no definite truth is ever attained. This view is simply false.
23 A more accurate account of Küng's position contains at least the following elements.
Revelation. For Küng, as for many modern theologians, the revelation of God is not a document or a series of documents but the flesh-andblood Jesus of Nazareth who walked the land of Judea two thousand years ago. 24 In his whole life and activity Jesus was the good news personified, the living gospel, the truth enfleshed, God's word. As such, universal faith of the Church; see Lumen gentium 25. 21 On this see my Infallibility: The Crossroads 239-42. 22 The Church Maintained 8-9. 23 The impression that Küng holds only for a vague persistence in the truth comes from certain texts of his taken in isolation. Thus we read: "More important than one or another false step, one or another wrong turn or detour, is the basic trend ... of the believing community in the truth and toward the ultimate truth" (ibid. 28).
24 "According to the New Testament the man Jesus of Nazareth is in his whole person the genuine revelation of the one God and Father Who sees Jesus sees the Father, says the gospel according to John. In Jesus, therefore, God himself is present to me, God is at work, God speaks, God acts, and this in a unique and definitive (eschatological) way" {His Work and His Way 166). Cf. Infallible? 218, 219. he is the "norma normans, the absolute standard" to which all "individual theologians" as well as "the community of the Church and its representatives and councils" must conform. 25 As such, too, he and the message which reflects who he was is the sole locus of infallibility in creation. 26 In short, Jesus in all that he did and said is the revelation of God. In him and in the gospel message which unerringly reflects who he was is found the only infallible norm to which all other personal and written norms must conform.
Scripture. But how does one gain access to Jesus and to the gospel message? There can be only one answer: through the Scriptures. However, "Scripture is not revelation: it attests revelation." 27 The Scriptures have a unique place in the Church because they are "the sole testimonies that have been recognized and acknowledged by the Church as sound, original tradition."
28 Although Küng admits that the Scriptures contain errors, he sees them as partaking in a derivative sense of the normativity of the gospel message they reflect. 29 In summary, Jesus Christ and the gospel message which unerringly reflects him is the primary norma normans. The Scriptures are a secondary norma normans to the degree that they reflect the primary norma normans. As such, they ground all subsequent ecclesiastical tradition.
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The noninfallibility of Scripture. Precisely because Scripture is a secondary norma normans, it lacks the perfection of the primary norma normans, Jesus Christ. First, there are no texts in Scripture that are a priori infallible 31 37 But what is the gospel, the Christian message, the original Christian testimony which is without error? Not the whole NT, because the NT contains errors, according to Küng. Rather, the gospel is the basic understanding of the meaning of the earthly Christ which was communicated to the first witnesses of his life and preaching. Since they confronted the revelation of God, the earthly Christ, they experienced him and reflected him before "Jesus' own words and deeds" were mixed with subsequent "interpretation, supplementation, paschal exaltation or glorification by the community or the evangelists." 38 According to Küng, this gospel, this initial understanding and testimony which is the Christian message par excellence, is contained within the Scriptures amid distortions and errors. It is not contained in this or that text but in the NT as a whole. 39 Moreover, it is possible to extract from the NT with high probability that basic conviction which is the gospel, the original testimony. This can be done through the use of the modern historical-critical method.
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The function of the gospel message in the Church of all the ages. The gospel is the very heart of Küng's teaching on infallibility and indefectibility; in fact, it is the heart of his theology as a whole. The function of the gospel, the original testimony about the reality of Jesus, is to be the total criterion of enduring truth in the Church of all the ages. 41 Since Jesus of Nazareth, the primary norm and infallible standard of truth, is no longer with us, the gospel now mediates him to us; for that gospel, as we have seen, is "the unerringly faithful testimony of this salvation Third, he holds for the necessity of a globally true articulation of the gospel in the NT as a whole, an articulation in which the original message can be clearly discerned. This is necessary in order that the Church be preserved against all possible subsequent distortions of the original Christian message. The truth of the gospel must shine forth enduringly in all clarity in at least one place, and thai place is the NT.
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Fourth, Küng asserts that in Scripture and in the proclamations of the Church in later ages there are to be found true statements of aspects of the gospel message. These statements are true and can be recognized as true, not because they follow from some purported charism of a priori infallibility, but because their meaning coincides with the gospel message enshrined in the NT as a whole 63 as that meaning is made clear by the modern historical-critical method. However, such true statements are only secondarily necessary for the continuance of the Church in gospel truth until the end. What is primarily necessary is the original gospel message and its preservation in the whole of the NT.
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Fifth, the secondary but real importance of official statements of belief for the continuance of the believing community is twofold. On the one hand, the persistence of the Church community is dependent upon summary professions of faith in Christ. These solidify the common faith of Christians by bringing it to articulation. Examples of such summary professions are the classical creeds and terse biblical affirmations such as "Jesus is Lord" or "Jesus is God's Son." 65 On the other hand, "the faith of the Church is dependent on polemical demarcations from what is unchristian."
66 Küng believes that in order to preserve its identity in the face of beliefs and practices that go counter to the heart of its own being, 71 On the other hand, he warns that the Church must be wary of the dangers attending all definitions, even necessary definitions in extreme emergencies: they "may have thoroughly negative consequences: doctrinaire fossilization, new and worse misunderstandings, the arrogance of orthodoxy, theological unteachability, and increasing ignorance on the part of the beati possidentes" 12 Kiing points out that a polemically oriented condemnation of error often does not point out the core of truth in the error. As a consequence, those accepting the condemnation of the error as correct may slip into the tacit rejection of the truth intermixed with the error.
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Seventh, Kiing reminds us that the meanings of verbal formulae shift with time and circumstances. 74 Hence it is dangerous to hang on to doctrinal formulae at all costs. What is necessary is the gospel message and the one it faithfully reflects, Jesus Christ. They are the significant realities to which all the formulae are intended to point.
EVALUATION AND CRITICISM OF KÜNG
I have one basic criticism. Before I take it up, I wish to contextualize it by two preliminary considerations. On the one hand, I wish to state unequivocally that apart from the minor criticisms of the next paragraph and the single major criticism which will constitute the bulk of this section, I agree practically in toto with all that Kiing says about a priori infallibility and with the comprehensive teaching on truth and indefectibility summarized in the prior section of this paper. 75 In particular, I judge that a large number of the constituent elements of his position on truth and indefectibility are solidly in line with Roman Catholic tradition.
On the other hand, I do have three minor criticisms. First, although I agree with Küng's opposition to a priori infallibility, I have already argued that this kind of infallibility was not assigned to Church officials by Vatican I and Vatican II. Second, I question Küng's rather Barthian notion of error in Scripture.
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1 prefer a view which combines respect for the long theological tradition of inspiration and inerrancy with the modern recognition that Scripture is characterized by (1) various literary forms and (2) a process of development of understanding which can be traced from the earlier to the later books.
77 Third, I agree with Kiing that the indefectibility of the Church does not require a deliberate plan of dogmatic development, a series of magisterial definitions of a tendentiousexplicating nature issued for reasons of ecclesiastical or theological policy or for purposes of piety and propaganda. What I disagree with is his assertion that the dogmas of papal primacy, papal infallibility, the Assumption, and the Immaculate Conception were proclaimed basically for such reasons. Of course, part of the motivation for these definitions was policy, piety, and even propaganda (which can have a good sense). This is nothing new. These factors were at work in the early councils. The presence of such factors as partial motives for a definition does not vitiate the definition or make it unnecessary. Far more thinking has to be done about the meaning and value of the four dogmas dismissed as unncessary by Kiing. Now for my basic criticism. For Kiing, the only ultimate and certainly true criterion of all theologizing is the concrete Jesus of Nazareth as reflected in the original message of eyewitnesses and determined for us from the whole of Scripture by modern exegetes using the historicalcritical method. This sentence enunciates the essential principle underlying Küng's conclusions in the area of infallibility. In fact, this principle 75 There are a few minor disagreements that I shall disregard, most of them in terminology and in tone. Thus, I regret that Kiing has used the term "a priori infallibility. underlies most of Küng's theology. 78 Once one concedes this principle, one is forced to concede much of what he holds in ecclesiology and Christology. I believe that it can be challenged theologically, philosophically, and historically. In the three following subdivisions I shall indicate the three areas of weakness in Küng's principle: the normativity of the earthly Jesus, the reliability and totality of content of the message of the original witnesses, and the ability of the modern practitioners of the historical-critical method to uncover the basic gospel message from Scripture.
The Normativity of the Earthly Jesus
According to Küng, the earthly Jesus is the revelation of God, the norma normans and non normata, the ultimate total created infallible standard to which all other standards must conform. I believe that one can seriously question both the infallibility and the totality of the earthly Jesus as the norm of Christian truth.
On gospel message present in Scripture; it is also superior to the official Church magisterium. It is undoubtedly fallible, but it is the last court of appeals. That being the case, it is at least questionable that Küng should assert that the earthly Jesus was infallible when the very method which he relies on to identify the earthly Jesus casts doubt on his infallibility.
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On the other hand, the notion that the earthly Jesus is the total norm of revelation is not merely questionable; it is theologically and historically false. The earthly Jesus is a norm, but only partial. The total norm is the fulfilled risen Jesus. This can be demonstrated in two steps.
First, the basic confession of faith by Christians from the beginning has been the proclamation not of the earthly Jesus of Nazareth but of the risen Christ, the Lord. Christian faith began with the Resurrection. Before Christ rose, his followers were completely demoralized. "Then came the resurrection. Its first effects were to transform the band of disillusioned disciples, or many of them at least, into a community of believers, which would later become a Church." 82 Further, the object of faith, that is, the revelation which is the correlative of faith, shifted. Whereas "the idea of the kingdom occupied a central place in the whole of Jesus' thought and teaching," 83 the newly illumined disciples proclaimed not the kingdom expressed by Jesus but Jesus himself as risen.
There can be no going back to the proclamation of Jesus as such. The kerygmata of Acts and Paul, and in a different way of John, demonstrate that the first Christians were not concerned simply to reproduce the message of Jesus. In the view of the earliest churches a decisive development had taken place which itself became the good news par excellence-that Jesus had been raised from the dead and exalted to heaven. It is this new development which forms the distinctive essence of the post-Easter proclamation, which gives it its distinctively Christian character In short, the Christian Church is built round the post-Easter kerygma, not the teaching of the historical Jesus. 88 Hence it is that the one who reveals God to us, the one who is the revelation of God to humankind, is not just the earthly Jesus but the Christ who "completed and perfected Revelation ... by words and works, signs and miracles, but above all by his death and glorious resurrection from the dead, and finally by sending the Spirit of truth." and no proclamation of that understanding of any concrete reality car ever fully capture that reality and (2) initial attempts to understand a concrete reality are especially vulnerable to being limited and one-sided.
1) The first affirmation follows from the fact that all things and events are concrete and multifaceted, whereas all understanding (together with its proclamation) is abstract and represents only a limited number of facets. To understand a concrete reality is to grasp it from one or at most a few perspectives, to see it from one's own limited concerns and sensitivities. Human understanding is by its nature partial and incomplete. The number of possible facets to be experienced, understood, and proclaimed is unlimited. No single group of observers and proclaimers could capture the reality that was Jesus of Nazareth.
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Küng, however, tends to identify the gospel message as testified to by the original witnesses with the concrete Jesus of Nazareth. He does not explicitly say that the one equals the other. Nevertheless, he does say that the original testimony is unerringly faithful to the earthly Jesus. Beyond this, he claims that this original testimony, this gospel, is the ultimate norma normans and non normata to which all other Church teaching must conform. In effect, he says that the facets grasped by the original witnesses encompass all other possible facets; for all facets grasped at a later date are to be judged as reflecting Christian truth to the degree that they conform to what was grasped and testified to by the original witnesses.
Kiing's view confuses a concrete reality and the totality of its facets with the few facets grasped by the original witnesses, the part with the whole. As a result, he makes the original testimony the total norm of Christian truth. In reality, that testimony can have at best only a limited negative normativity. This would mean that no subsequent understanding falling within the same perspectives as those of the original witnesses should be permitted to contradict the understanding of those witnesses.
2) Initial attempts to understand a concrete reality are especially vulnerable to being limited and one-sided. I make this point because one may concede that the testimony of the original witnesses does not totally reflect Christ and yet claim that this testimony gives the original comprehensive perspective within which all subsequent and narrower perspectives fall. I claim that just the opposite is true. It is not the original witnesses but the later interpreters who tend to view a concrete reality 92 From this analysis one can understand the difference between a pluralism of truth and a pluralism of error. A pluralism of truth results from the emergence of new perspectives and from an intelligent and reasonable grasp of reality within those perspectives; it is a pluralism which derives from the unfolding of further facets of a reality. A pluralism of error results from the giving of contradictory answers to the same question within a given perspective. In the concrete both pluralisms exist together. from the broadest, most comprehensive, and most ultimate perspectives.
There are a number of reasons why this is so. First, later interpreters are able to compare various eyewitness accounts. Second, they know what subsequently happened and thus spot the salient causal factors hardly noticed by the original witnesses. Third, the development of the race adds new sensitivities to future observers; this enables them to detect aspects about persons and societies (e.g., defense mechanisms, the patterns characterizing the emergence of governmental structures, etc.) which could not have been grasped by much earlier eyewitnesses. Finally, the later interpreters have the opportunity to live out in a newer context the values proclaimed in the events described by the original witnesses and thus gain an understanding of these values which was not possessed by the first witnesses. Thus, Americans who have struggled through the problems of gaining equal rights for minorities and for women often have a broader sense of the meaning of the equality of all human beings than did many of the Founding Fathers.
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Up to now I have treated the philosophical objection to considering the gospel or original Christian testimony as the total infallible norm of Christian truth. There is a properly theological objection. According to Roman Catholic tradition, it is the whole of Scripture which is normative, not one part or aspect. 94 However, the Kiingian gospel is really but another form of the "canon within the canon" espoused by principle exalts either certain books of the Bible, or one or more doctrines, or the earliest strata of traditional material to the status of norm to which all other aspects of Scripture and later tradition must be subordinated and by which these other aspects are to be judged and corrected. Although Roman Catholic thought recognizes that some books of the Bible are more important than others 98 and that some truths are more basic than others," it has ever seen the Bible as a whole as a norm of truth. The modern recognition of the pluralism and evolution of views within the NT has not destroyed this wholistic Catholic principle. It has only necessitated that the exegete envision the NT as containing a series of partial views of the one revelation in Christ as seen from different perspectives and/or at different stages of development.
100 These perspectives must be respected in their uniqueness; they must be seen in tension with one another, straining toward the fulness of a truth that exceeds each of them and even all combined. The exegete may not so exalt one perspective or set of perspectives that it corrects all others and subordinates them to itself.
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The Practitioners of Historical-Critical Method Once one makes the testimony of the original witnesses central, one is confronted with the question "Who is to determine the content of that message for the present-day Church?" Kiing replies: the teachers in the Church. 102 More precisely, since the gospel is imbedded along with errors in Scripture, the task of uncovering it belongs in the first instance to those trained in the historical-critical method which is appropriate for extracting the gospel from Scripture.
What, then, of Church leaders, the pope and the bishops? Their primary task is the proclamation of the gospel.
103 They may also possess the charism of teacher, but this is not the rule.
104 In the ordinary case, then, they will learn the gospel message in a collaboration with the teachers. 105 In effect, Church leaders are to proclaim the gospel which is 242-61, esp. 258. Ogden locates the canon within the canon in "the earliest layer of the Synoptic tradition" (ibid. 258). 98 The Constitution on Divine Revelation at Vatican II acknowledged that the four Gospels have a special place in the NT {Dei ver bum 18). 99 The Decree on Ecumenism ( Unitatis redintegratio 11) articulated the now famous notion of the "hierarchy of truths." This notion had roots in the tradition in the idea that certain truths were essential to salvation. 100 Dunn, Unity and Diversity, is an excellent summary of pluralism and development in Scripture. 101 The exaltation of one perspective to the position of judge of all other perspectives has the effect of ruling out in advance the possibilities of a development of dogma. This is so because the primary factor in the development of dogma is the emergence of new perspectives. The first flaw stems from Küng's failure to grasp the nonexegetical factors that influence all interpretation. The exegete's native ability and training are necessary but by no means sufficient for the task of properly interpreting the text. One must not only know the background of time and place, the language, the literary customs, but must also be in profound contact with the reality described in the text.
Let me illustrate. Suppose I wish to interpret a text by an Oriental mathematician of the Middle Ages. Certainly I need to know the language of the period and the symbols used by the author. However, the most important qualification is knowledge of mathematics. AU other things being equal, the more mathematics I know, the better I shall be able to grasp what the medieval writer meant. It will enable me to fill in what is cryptic, to surmise what is only implied, to make explicit the connections the author took for granted. If I know no mathematics, I may be able to learn how to manipulate the symbols the author used, but I will not be able to appropriate the thought processes and the understanding which these symbols represent.
The same is true for the theological exegete. If he or she has not deeply grasped and internalized the reality articulated in the text, the mere acquisition of technical skills will not be sufficient for the appropriation of the reality seen by the original writer. It is true that the exegete will be able to grasp the significance of things known by all-eyes and ears, arms and legs, seeing and breathing, etc.; for the exegete has experienced and understood these realities. But suppose that the exegete's faith experience has no reference to the living risen Christ, that he or she has never participated in a liturgical tradition in which one prays to Christ, consciously receives him as living in the Eucharistie bread and wine, really experiences that where two or three are gathered in his name he is there. Such an exegete can easily read the NT text as speaking in symbolic language about an existential encounter with God; can easily believe that there is no present actual Christ whose risen being and power extends to the far corners of the universe, one who in his humanity is Lord of creation; can honestly believe that the NT uses mythological language in order to convey to us the existential conditions of salvation which always prevailed-even before Christ. The reason for this belief will not be the exegete's native ability or training in the historical-critical method; it will be the basic presuppositions coming from an experience of faith.
What does all this mean? Not that we can dispense with the skills of exegetes; only that it is foolhardy and methodologically unsound to put one's trust solely in the exegete. What is also necessary is an immersion in the living faith experience of the Christian community in such a way that there emerges to consciousness the universal faith elements, the elements common and significant to the faith life of the ages, the elements whose continuing existence in unarticulated form constitutes the essence of the indefectibility of the Church as Küng describes it. True, such an experiential immersion may pertain to this or that exegete; yet there is no guarantee that this will be so. Many have tended to identify their own concrete understanding and expression of faith or that of their local communities with the Catholic faith. They lack the background and the ability to grasp that all faith life is lived concretely, that the concrete is inevitably culturally conditioned and constituted by elements which have validity for only one or a few places and times, that a pure unconditioned and timeless concrete life of faith has never existed and never will exist, and that their own concrete faith life necessarily contains elements destined to pass away.
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106 It is one thing to say that all concrete faith is culturally conditioned and unique and that it possesses elements which are destined to pass away, quite another to say that one can never grasp anything universal in the faith life of the Church. The first statement is true, the second false. Within the context of differing concrete faith experiences it is possible to grasp what is universal to faith even though that which is universal in faith can never exist in some pure concrete form. An analogy may help. No one has ever seen a perfect There are persons, however, whose faith, though not necessarily deeper, is broader. It is a faith which can grasp the validity of certain differences, can recognize more explicitly what the universal abstract elements of faith are, can understand and appreciate the diversity of faith expression which is the richness of unity, and can distinguish a legitimate culturally conditioned expression of the true faith from an expression which deforms it. It is among such persons of broad faith that one finds those who are called by God to the episcopacy. They are the ones who can unify persons of diverse concrete faith lives, because they can appreciate the values of a faith life different from their own. They have the God-given charism of tuning in on the faith life of others, of being enriched by it, and of seeing further aspects of the risen Christ in it than is furnished by their own experience of faith.
The consecration of a bishop is meant to recognize such broad faith, to symbolize the commitment of the individual to Uve out such faith for the unity of all, to express the community's pledge to communicate its various faith expressions to the bishop and to be guided by his more universal grasp of the total needs of faith. If a person truly possesses this kind of episcopal faith, then his undertaking of the office of bishop will furnish him with the challenge and the opportunity to broaden and deepen that faith. This flows from his relationship not only to his people but also to the bishops around the world and to the pope. The key result is that, more than any others, the bishops of the world have the ability to represent what is universal in the lived faith of the Church.
This universality of faith does not come basically through interpreting a text but by interpreting the faith life of the people. It comes from detecting what is common to the faith of many, despite all differences. It comes not because one is isolated in a unique personal faith but precisely concrete circle made of wire or drawn on paper. No such circle constituted by a line with no width whose every point is equidistant from the center has ever been experienced. We can only experience with our senses the "culturally conditioned" circles of real life, all of which possess qualities which do not pertain to the ideal circle. Nevertheless, precisely through our concrete experiences of diverse culturally conditioned circles we are able to grasp what pertains to all circles. Similarly, within the context of unique culturally conditioned faith we can grasp elements which pertain to all faith life. We can grasp that Christ will always be with us, even if he will be with each individual in a unique way. We can even grasp with unshakeable certitude that each of us is culturally conditioned, even if we come to that grasp from a uniquely culturally conditioned background. It is the fact (1) that there are imbedded within concrete unique lives factors which have universal import and (2) that these universal factors can be abstracted and grasped conceptually, which enables the Church to proclaim the irreformable doctrines mentioned in the definition (DS 3074) of the infallible magisterium of the Roman pontiff at Vatican I. Such irreformable doctrines are not merely true; they are irreformably true, because they represent enduring aspects of reality itself, aspects which are graspable within a series of ever-changing contexts. 
A Summary Critique of Küng
For Küng, the ultimate criterion of Christian truth is the concrete Jesus of Nazareth as he is reflected in the original message of the eyewitnesses and determined for us today from the whole of the Scriptures by modern exegetes using the historical-critical method. My own belief is not so much that this assertion is false as that it is incomplete. Its incompleteness shows up in each of its three components. First, the earthly Jesus is only a partial norm; the full norm is the risen Christ who carries forward and completes this earthly Jesus. Second, the original witnesses only partially and imperfectly reflect the real Jesus; what they witness has to be complemented by other and richer perspectives such as those which recognize Christ as Son of God from all eternity. Third, the skill of exegetes is only one of the skills necessary for the detection and interpretation in a modern context of what is normative in Christianity; it needs to be complemented by the episcopal charism which detects the universal elements not in texts but in the living faith of present-day Christians.
In short, my principal criticism of Küng is that in the basic notion upon which all his theologizing rests he is too restrictive and particularistic. He is not catholic enough. 112 By "a traditional view" I shall mean a view which incorporates the elements of the magisterial position, although expanding it in some aspects. I use the word "a" to indicate that there can be other views which are faithful to the teaching of the magisterium while going beyond it.
Because Küng places the total locus of infallible understanding and proclamation in the initial witnesses, he restricts the object of their testimony to the earthly Jesus; the risen Christ only confirms what the earthly Jesus said and did. Further, because the total definitive understanding is in these initial witnesses, all other proclamations of the faith have validity only to the extent that they are reducible to the understanding of these witnesses. Hence the only way one can arrive at definitive understanding of the faith today is by means of scientific exegesis; for this alone permits us to tune in on the sole definitive proclamation of the faith, that of the original witnesses.
In contrast, because a traditional position recognizes that the lived faith of all the ages is a source of doctrine, it necessarily recognizes that the living risen Christ, not just the earthly Jesus, is also the object faith encounters in ever new ways. Moreover, precisely because the whole faith life of the Church is the matrix of ecclesial understanding, a traditional view recognizes that exegesis is not enough to grasp and proclaim the fulness of revelation. In such a view two skills are necessary; an expanded exegetical skill and a discerning skill. The expanded exegetical skill enables the present Church to tune in on the total faith life of the pastnot just the scriptural past. The discerning skill enables the Church to tune in on the faith life of the present as it exists in concrete persons and not just in a textual representation. By the exercise of these two skills in a symbiotic relationship the present Church can understand and proclaim not only what was grasped by the original witnesses but also those universal elements of faith whose existence came explicitly to the Church's attention only after the biblical age.
There is a further difference between the two views. Küng appears to believe that the total experience of the earthly Jesus by the original witnesses is normative. Out ofthat total experience a portion is expressed and left to us in Scripture mingled with errors and subsequent interpretations. A traditional view, such as the one I have outlined, does not think that the total faith experience of Christians over the ages is normative. It recognizes that Christian faith in the concrete is truncated, warped, mingled with elements of nonfaith. Hence it sees that the only elements which can become part of the definitive faith are those which stand the test of time and place and culture, those which appear again and again under the most diverse of circumstances, the universal elements of faith life. This is a more realistic view, even for the faith of the original witnesses. The notion that they had total faith accuracy in their experiential response to Jesus seems highly unlikely not only from what we know about human understanding but also from what we know about the obtuseness of the initial witnesses.
Towards Rapprochement
Although there is a huge gulf between the central aspects of each view, there are a number of elements in Küng's overall teaching which, if developed, would bring him very close to what I have called "a traditional view." Basic to grasping such rapprochement is the recognition of the truth of Küng's notion that faith and its certitude are primarily aspects of concrete experience and only subsequently can they be thematized and expressed in statements. Put another way and generalized, concrete experience is the matrix of abstract understanding and subsequent expression.
With this in mind, let us divide the history of the Church's faith life into three periods: (1) the period of the original witnesses, (2) the NT period which followed the period of the original witnesses, and (3) the post-NT period to the present.
According to Kling, the lived faith of the Church within which genuine certitude is buried spans all three periods. This is what he means by the indefectibility of the Church. However, normative understanding and expression of the meaning of that living faith in an originating way is restricted to the first period. He does not accord to the second and third periods the capacity to grasp definitively aspects of the lived faith not grasped in the first period. Now despite the fact that Küng explicitly rejects the idea that there can be originating normative understanding of revealed truth in the second and third periods, he implicitly concedes in varying degrees that the capacity to come to such normative understanding does extend to both those periods. Consider the following points in his exposition.
First, Küng notes that statements cannot express the fulness of faith.
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This, of course, is but an adaptation to the realm of faith of a commonplace of cognitional theory, namely, that no act of understanding and no series of acts of understanding can ever exhaust the truth of the content of a human experience. 114 This is especially true of the experience one has of a person-above all, of the concrete person who was Jesus Christ. No number of statements in all the books of the world could contain the reality he was and is.
Second, Küng asserts as gospel truth at least one notion that the historical-critical method indicates was not known by the original witnesses but which came to be known only in the second period. I mean indefectibility. There are general and specific indications that this notion was originally grasped in the second period, not in the first. In fact, the historical-critical method's evidence points to the conclusion that the The general evidence for this is twofold. On the one hand, there is no hard historical-critical evidence that Christ believed that the end fulfilment was to be long delayed, but there is some evidence that he believed it to be quite near. 115 On the other hand, there is strong evidence that the early Christians believed the Second Coming would take place in their lifetimes. 116 If the probabilities are that neither Christ nor the early Christians thought that the consummation of the world would be long delayed, it seems highly unlikely that they would have proclaimed as a truth of faith the indefectibility of the Church. There is no need to proclaim that the faith will last until the end if that end is just around the corner. Indefectibility makes sense as a teaching only to those who need the encouragement that God will sustain their faith over great periods of time. This fits the conditions of the second period.
The specific evidence that indefectibility arose in the second period springs from the individual texts Küng points out as expressions of the doctrine. Each of these texts appears to have originated in the second period. None of them is seen by the majority of exegetes using the historical-critical method as being traceable back to Christ and the original witnesses. 117 My point is that at least in this one case Kiing's performance, if not his explicit principle, points to the origin of a truth of faith not in the first period but in the second. The evidence tends to say that from the experience that the Second Coming was obviously postponed the Church came to understand that Christ and his Spirit would be with it and preserve it in faith until the end, no matter when that end came. 118 A similar argument can be made with regard to Kiing's view of charisms. He objects to the idea that bishops should have teaching authority in addition to their pastoral authority because such a "monopolizing of the charisms in a hierocracy of pastors clearly contradicts the New Testament message and the New Testament Church" (Infallible?230). It seems that for Kung it is normative that the pastoral and teaching functions should be separated. However, this is a view that cannot easily be traced back to the earthly Jesus. It is, rather, the teaching of St. Paul. If Küng intends to make this normative-and I admit that the text is not clear-he is once more conceding to the second period the power to express definitively the meaning of the faith. the texts of the present Bible, and that only after the NT period was there any opportunity for considerable numbers of persons to possess the whole NT and hence be in a position to extract the gospel truths which pertain only to the total sweep of the Scriptures. 119 In fact, only with the inception of the modern historical-critical method can the Church with great certitude know the truths of the gospel, because only present exegetes have the tools to extract these from Scripture. The main point here is that only in the third period is the process operating of abstracting the general from the many particulars which for Küng gives rise to our knowledge of gospel truths. This may not be an infallible process; but it is one process which enables us to know gospel truth, and it was operative not in the first or second period but in the third alone.
Thus it seems that there are possibilities in Küng's view for his development toward a traditional view which incorporates the teachings of Vatican I and II. However, it must be admitted that for Küng to develop in this manner, he would have to reject (1) his canon within the canon and (2) his notion that the bishops as Church leaders are merely the present official proclaimers of what exegetes have determined to be the meaning of the testimony of the original witnesses. He would have to accept instead (1) the normativity of the whole of Scripture and (2) the further role of the bishops as the definitive witnesses not just of that area of faith experience articulated by the original witnesses but also of that area of universal faith experience which, though not articulated explicitly in the beginning, yet persists in the living faith of the Church over the ages.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
Küng has made a number of significant contributions which can be incorporated into a traditional view of infallibility in order to enrich it. First, he has attacked a priori infallibility and has revealed the dangers of creeping infallibility and magisterial absolutism which can flow from its acceptance. His objections have made it evident that the Church will be well served if it makes clear officially that a priori infallibility is not the teaching of Vatican I. Second, he has stressed that the basic infallibility in the Church is not the conceptual infallibility of dogmatic decisions but the lived infallibility which can be called "indefectibility" from his perspective or the sensus fidelium from another perspective. Third, he has indicated the limitations and dangers attached to magisterial decisions as well as the cautions to be observed when such decisions are made.
Küng is mistaken, however, in placing the criterion for judging all tradition in the initial witness to Jesus of Nazareth as determined by the modern historical-critical study of the NT. This "canon within the canon" is historically, philosophically, and theologically untenable. If Küng accepts the implications of a number of points in his own position, he may be able to shake this weak starting point and accept the normativity of the witness of the whole lived tradition within which the total NT has a privileged place. This would permit a development from his own position toward an enriched magisterial position which would be faithful both to the Vatican Councils and to the insights proclaimed by Küng himself.
